We study optimal monetary policy and welfare properties of a DSGE model with a labor selection process, labor turnover costs and Nash bargained wages. We show that our model implies inefficiencies which cannot be offset in a standard wage bargaining regime. We also show that the inefficiencies rise with the magnitude of firing costs. As a result, in the optimal Ramsey plan, the optimal inflation volatility deviates from zero and is an increasing function of firing costs. 
Introduction
There is a large literature showing that labor turnover costs can signi…cantly a¤ect the hiring and …ring process and thus abate worker ‡ows (see, e.g., Hopenhayn Despite this, the role of labor turnover costs has been largely neglected in the analysis of optimal policy. 1 In this paper, we analyze the welfare e¤ects of labor turnover costs with a particular focus on the design of optimal monetary policy.
We analyze this question within a DSGE model in which the labor market is characterized by a labor selection process, where …rms select the most suitable workers, taking into consideration labor turnover costs. The model also features nominal rigidities, induced by adjustment costs on prices, as those are essential to address the real e¤ects of monetary policy. A more detailed description of the labor market is as follows. Workers can apply only at one particular …rm per discrete time period. Each worker-…rm pair discerns its suitability, with the …rm assessing whether there is a pro…t opportunity. Suitability is modeled based on an idiosyncratic productivity shock (in the form of operating costs), which is drawn when the two parties meet. This labor selection process produces worker ‡ows which evolve endogenously and depend on the labor turnover costs. 2 An applicant is only hired when the future stream of discounted expected pro…ts exceeds the hiring costs. An incumbent is …red when the future stream of discounted expected pro…ts falls short of the …ring costs. The wage process is modeled by considering two alternative bargaining arrangements: collective bargaining and individualistic bargaining. We show that in both cases Nash bargaining fails to allow decentralization of the e¢ cient solution. 3 Before proceeding with the design of optimal monetary policy, we discuss the role of labor turnover costs for the cyclical properties of labor market ‡ows. The model outlined is indeed capable of generating strong ampli…cation and persistence e¤ects. The presence of idiosyncratic match speci…c shocks produces endogenous ‡uctuations in the job-…nding rate. This ampli…es 1 Some works have analyzed the business cycle implications of …ring costs in search and matching models. See Costain et al. 2010 and Thomas and Zanetti 2009 . 2 This di¤ers from a traditional search and matching model, which instead can be interpreted as a contact model (i.e., the matching function establishes a contact between workers and …rms). See Brown et al. (2010) . 3 Collective bargaining is analyzed for two reasons. First, empirical studies (e.g. Cahuc and Carcillo 2011) show a positive correlation between …ring costs and collective bargaining. Second, collective bargaining generates clear-cut analytical results for e¢ ciency, which help to understand the nature of the monetary policy trade-o¤.
the response of worker ‡ows to aggregate shocks. 4 Labor turnover costs tend to increase the retention rate, and to dampen the job-…nding rate. As current employment becomes dependent on past employment, the model features additional persistence in response to shocks compared to a standard Walrasian labor market, much in line with the empirical evidence.
To analyze the welfare implications of labor turnover costs in the labor selection process, we …rst qualify the nature of the underlying distortion by comparing the competitive equilibrium (under ‡exible prices) with the constrained pareto optimal allocation. Atomistic …rms fail to internalize the e¤ects of their decisions on aggregate unemployment, and thus on the pool of searching workers.
This externality manifests itself in the di¤erence between the e¢ cient wage and the competitive wage: the …rst indeed responds to future productivity changes, while the second does not. 5 We also show that the ine¢ ciency of the competitive economy increases with the level of …ring costs.
To model the design of optimal monetary policy in this context, we use a public …nance approach which mandates the use of state contingent instruments to correct distortions. For this reason, we employ the Ramsey approach 6 to analyze the design of optimal monetary policy. The optimal (Ramsey) plan is obtained by maximizing the discounted sum of agents'utilities subject to the constraints describing the competitive economy, therefore taking into account both short-run and long-run distortions. In our model, the Ramsey planner faces a tension between con ‡icting goals, stabilizing in ‡ation versus stabilizing employment. On the one hand, he would like to close the in ‡ation costs by setting in ‡ation volatility to zero. On the other hand, it would be optimal to use in ‡ation as a state contingent instrument to stabilize employment ‡uctuations. As a result of this trade-o¤, the optimal volatility of in ‡ation deviates from zero. Since …ring costs increase the ine¢ ciency in the competitive economy, they also increase the optimal volatility of in ‡ation.
Recently several authors have studied the design of optimal monetary policy in DSGE models with search and matching frictions (see, e.g., Blanchard and Galí 2010 , Faia 2009 and Thomas 2008 ), a setting which allows to consider ine¢ cient unemployment and congestion externalities 4 We …nd that the cyclical standard deviation of the job-…nding rate and unemployment is several times larger than the one of output. See also Lechthaler et al. 2010 . 5 We show that neither collective nor standard individualistic Nash bargained wages can internalize this externality. Under collective bargaining there is also an additional distortion coming from the emergence of involuntary unemployment, as some workers would be willing to work at the current wages, but cannot. See also Christiano when the Hosios 1990 condition is not met. None has considered optimal policy design for a model with labor selection and labor turnover costs. The analysis in this paper moves a step forward. In the search and matching model as well as in our model the wage loses the inter-temporal allocative role and atomistic …rms fail to internalize the e¤ects of their current hiring policy on the future pool of searching workers. Despite these similarities with other models featuring pecuniary externalities in the labor market, there are important di¤erences which have implications for both the models' predictive power in terms of business cycle statistics and the implications for optimal monetary policy. In the search and matching model, over-hiring today a¤ects the future probability that both …rms and workers get in "contact" with each other (hence the labor market tightness). In the labor selection model, there is a composition e¤ect: …rms do not take into account the e¤ects of their decisions on the future size of the pool of searching workers and thus distort the composition of employment (i.e., the mix of incumbent and newly hired workers). Our e¢ ciency analysis also
shows that in our model there is no simple rule (like the Hosios condition) that can restore e¢ ciency (neither under collective nor under individualistic bargaining).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 shows some stylized facts relating the dynamics of selected macro variables and labor turnover costs. Section 3 presents the model. 
Labor Turnover Costs and Output Dynamics
To analyze the quantitative properties of our model it is useful to study the extent of labor turnover costs in the data and their e¤ects on output dynamics. There is a vast literature 7 looking at the importance of labor turnover costs and employment protection legislation for unemployment and labor market ‡ows. Evidence shows that hiring and …ring costs tend to depress labor market ‡ows, particularly in European economies, a phenomenon labeled as Eurosclerosis and captured by our model. 7 The literature dates back to Solow 1968 , Sargent 1978 , Nickell 1978 , 1986 . More recently, Bentolila and Bertola 1990 and Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993 have shown that hiring and …ring costs reduce labor turnover. Alvarez and Veracierto 2001 …nd that severance payments decrease aggregate productivity and output. We document the e¤ects of labor turnover costs on the business cycle by testing the relation between such costs and the volatility of the cyclical component of output. We focus on euro area data for two reasons. First, euro area countries have higher turnover costs than Anglo-Saxon countries. Second, the EMU period o¤ers a unique experiment in which monetary policy was unaltered by regime shifts.
The data sample used covers the years from 1999 to mid-2008. This choice is motivated by the following reasons. First, it is motivated by our interest in studying the recent implications of labor market regulations for macroeconomic dynamics. Second, we need to isolate the dynamics of macro variables from policy regime shifts and thereby the choice to focus on the EMU period. 8 Figure 1 shows a negative and statistically signi…cant relationship between labor turnover costs and the volatility of output. The volatility of real economic activity is calculated based on a quarterly output gap measure. The seasonally adjusted real GDP series (in 2000 prices) is taken from the International Financial Statistics. The output gap is calculated as percentage deviation of output from its trend, namely the Hodrick-Prescott …lter with smoothing parameter = 1600. As a proxy for labor turnover costs, we use the employment protection legislation index (see OECD 2004), which is a weighted average of indicators capturing protection of regular workers against individual dismissals, requirements for collective dismissals and regulation of temporary employment. We choose this index because it is a more precise measure than alternative employment protection indicators. 9 The negative correlation between the EPL index and output volatility remains robust also when we consider alternative speci…cations which include the GDP per capita, the interaction between employment protection and the gross replacement rate. 10 The relation above can be explained as follows. Higher labor turnover costs imply that the retention rates exceed job-…nding rates, and thus current employment depends on past employment. The persistence in employment carries over to output. For the same observation period and the same sample of countries, we also …nd the expected positive relationship between the EPL and the …rst order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of output (statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level).
In Section 4 we show that our model can replicate well both the above mentioned stylized facts and a number of business cycle statistics.
The Model
Our model grafts a labor market with labor selection, labor turnover costs, collective wage bargaining, and employed and unemployed workers into a New Keynesian framework with Rotemberg adjustment costs. 11 Households in our model make consumption decisions: due to insurance schemes such consumption decisions are independent from the employment history of the individual members of the family. Workers are heterogenous in terms of their operating costs. These assumptions allow endogenous hiring and …ring decisions. Wages are set collectively with a Nash bargaining process between …rms and incumbent workers. Firms in the production sector act in a monopolistic competitive fashion and face price adjustment costs a la Rotemberg 1982. 9 Compared with other indicators, such as the Employment Legislation Index in Botero et al. 2003 , or the hiring and …ring costs calculated by the World Bank in its "Doing Business" studies, the OECD's indicator covers a larger range of relevant aspects of LTCs.
1 0 Further evidence for the negative correlation between employment protection and employment/output volatility can be found in Abbritti and Weber (2009 
Households
We assume that households have a standard utility function of the form:
where is the household's discount factor, the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, c a consumption aggregate (described below) 12 and E is the expectations operator.
As common in the literature (see Andolfatto 1996 or Merz 1995), we assume that each household consists of a large number of individuals, each individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically and shares all income with the other household members. This implies that consumption does not depend on a worker's employment status. Thus, the representative household maximizes its utility subject to the budget constraint:
where Bo are nominal holdings of one period discounted bonds, P is the aggregate price level, T are lump-sum tax payments, i is the nominal interest rate, a are nominal aggregate pro…ts, which are transferred in lump-sum manner, W is the nominal wage, N is the total household labor input, B are unemployment bene…ts, …nanced via a lump-sum tax, and U is the number of unemployed workers. Inter-temporal utility maximization yields the standard consumption Euler equation:
where t+1 is the expected in ‡ation rate.
Production and the Labor Market
There are three types of …rms. Firms producing intermediate goods employ labor, exhibit linear labor turnover costs (i.e., hiring and …ring costs) and sell their homogenous products on a perfectly competitive market to the wholesale sector. Firms in the wholesale sector transform the intermediate goods into consumption goods and sell them under monopolistic competition to the retailers. They can change their price at any time but price adjustments are subject to a quadratic adjustment cost a la Rotemberg 1982. The retailers, in turn, aggregate the consumption goods and sell them under perfect competition to the households.
Intermediate Goods Producers and Employment Dynamics
Intermediate good …rms hire labor to produce the intermediate good z. Their production function is:
where a is technology and N the number of employed workers. They sell the product at a relative price mc t = P z;t =P t , which they take as given in a perfectly competitive environment, where P z is the absolute price of the intermediate good and P is the economy's overall price level. The variable mc t in this economy plays the role of marginal costs.
Each period every unemployed worker …les an application at one particular …rm and then draws a random operating cost realization ", which follows a probability distribution g(" t ). The operating costs can be interpreted as a worker-…rm pair speci…c idiosyncratic cost-shock. When the applicant draws a bad realization of the shock, he stays unemployed and applies at another …rm the next period. Employed workers draw realizations from the same shock distribution and are …red when they draw a bad realization.
The …rms learn the value of the operating costs of every worker at the beginning of a period and base their employment decisions on it, i.e., an unemployed worker with a favorable shock will be employed while an employed worker with a bad shock will be …red. Hiring and …ring is not without costs, …rms have to pay linear hiring costs, h, and linear …ring costs, f , both measured in terms of the …nal consumption good. Wages are determined through Nash bargaining between incumbent workers and the …rm (see the online Appendix for a di¤erent bargaining assumption).
The bargaining process takes the form of a right to manage. This assumption leads to the following timing of events. First, the operating cost shock takes place and median workers and the intermediate goods …rm bargain over the wage. Given the wage schedule, …rms make their hiring and …ring decisions. Thus, …rms will only hire those workers who face low operating costs and …re those workers who face high operating costs.
The operating costs, ", are measured in terms of the …nal consumption good. Moreover we de…ne the hiring and the …ring threshold respectively as h;t and f;t : In non-recursive form the value of an average incumbent can be expressed as the in…nite sum of discounted future pro…ts:
where w is the real wage, is the separation probability, and t;j is the stochastic discount factor from period t to j. To simplify the value of an average incumbent, we rewrite it in recursive form as:
A marginal worker is hired whenever the current and future expected discounted pro…ts are larger than the hiring costs. Note that the expected pro…t has to be indexed by t + 1:
Unemployed workers whose operating cost is lower than this value get a job, while those whose operating cost is higher remain unemployed. The resulting hiring probability is given by:
Similarly, the …rm will …re a worker if current losses are higher than the …ring cost. Again, a zero pro…t condition de…nes the …ring threshold as follows:
and the separation rate is de…ned as:
The change in employment (N t N t 1 ) is the di¤erence between hirings from the unemployment pool ( U t 1 ) and …rings from the employment pool ( N t 1 ), where U t 1 and N t 1 are the aggregate unemployment and employment levels:
Letting (n t = N t =L t ) be the employment rate, we assume a constant workforce, L t , and normalize it to one. Therefore, the employment dynamics read as follows:
The unemployment rate is simply u t = 1 n t . From equation 11 it is immediately clear that present employment depends on past employment in presence of labor turnover costs. If there are no labor turnover costs the hiring rate equals the retention rate ( = 1 ) and equation 11 collapses to n t = t . However, as already discussed, labor turnover costs drive a wedge between hiring rate and retention rate, the terms no longer cancel and, thus, employment depends on past employment (the persistence is larger with larger hiring and …ring costs).
Wage Bargaining
For simplicity, let the real wage w t be the outcome of a Nash bargain between the median worker 13 with operating cost " I and her …rm. The median worker faces no risk of dismissal at the negotiated wage. The wage is renegotiated in each period t. Under bargaining agreement, the median worker receives the real wage w t and the …rm receives the expected pro…t (a t mc t w t ) in each period t.
Under disagreement, the worker's fallback income is b, assumed for simplicity to be equal to the real unemployment bene…t. 14 The …rm's fallback position is k, where k is the cost for the …rm in case of disagreement. 15 This cost might arise because of lost production or due to a potential strike. Assuming that disagreement in the current period does not a¤ect future surpluses, workers' surplus is (w t b) while the …rm's surplus is a I t mc w t " I + k, where " I are the operating costs of the median worker. Consequently, the Nash-product is:
1 3 For simplicity, we allow the median worker to bargain over wages. Our bargaining process has similarities with the one in Hall and Milgrom 2008. There are, however, important di¤erences. In our case the wage is …xed in the cross-section but not over time. Individualistic bargaining would not change the main implications of the model. See online Appendix A for details. 1 4 For realism, we set a positive value of b in all our quantitative exercises. But we set it to zero in the comparison between social planner and competitive economy. 1 5 The assumption that the fall-back option is not the outside option is consistent with the bargaining literature (see, e.g., Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinksy, 1986).
where 2 (0; 1) represents the bargaining strength of the worker relative to the …rm. Maximizing the Nash-product with respect to the real wage, yields the following simple equation:
Note that the collectively bargained wage depends upon the median worker's idiosyncratic productivity: this induces involuntary unemployment as workers with lower operating costs would be willing to work at lower wages, but cannot be hired at the collectively bargained wages. In online Appendix A, we will discuss also the case of individual bargained wages.
Wholesale Sector and Retail Sector
Firms in the wholesale sector are distributed on the unit interval and indexed by i. They produce a di¤erentiated good y i;t using the linear production technology y i;t = z i;t , where z i;t is their demand for intermediate goods. They sell their goods under monopolistic competition to the retailers who use the di¤erentiated goods to produce the …nal consumption good according to the Dixit-Stiglitz-
, where is the demand elasticity. The index above is associated with the price index
(where P i;t and y i;t denote the …rm speci…c price and output level respectively). From the cost minimization problem of the aggregating …rm, we obtain the optimal demand function for di¤erentiated products:
Firms in the wholesale-sector can change their prices every period, facing quadratic price adjustment costs a la Rotemberg. They maximize the following pro…t function:
where is a parameter measuring the extent of price adjustment costs, which are due whenever there are price changes (i.e., whenever P i;j =P i;j 1 is di¤erent from 1). Taking the derivative with respect to the price yields, after some manipulations, the following expectational Phillips curve:
Aggregation
To solve for the equilibrium, we start by deriving aggregate real pro…ts of intermediate …rms which
are given by revenues minus wage payments, operating costs and labor turnover costs:
where i t is the expected value of operating costs for incumbent workers, conditional on not being …red and e t is the expected value of operating costs for entrants, conditional on being hired, de…ned by:
The real pro…ts (~ W ) of the wholesale sector are given by:
Retailers earn zero-pro…ts. Aggregate real pro…ts in this economy are therefore given by:
The latter can be substituted into the budget constraint, (2), and after imposing equilibrium in the bond market and using the government budget constraint (g t + B t u t = T t ) we obtain the following resource constraint:
Note that …nal aggregate demand includes government expenditure, g t ; which follows an exogenous AR(1) process.
Inspection of the resource constraint shows that the presence of hiring and …ring costs as well as of price adjustment costs induces a waste of resources. Indeed, setting hiring and …ring costs to zero would increase output by an amount equal to n t t f + (1 n t ) t h, while setting in ‡ation equal to zero would increase output by an amount equal to 2 ( t 1) 2 y t :
Dynamic Properties of the Model
Before turning to the design of optimal monetary policy, we outline the calibration of the model and study the quantitative properties of the model under a Taylor rule.
Model Calibration
The calibration is summarized in table 1 below.
Preferences. The discount rate, , is set to 0:99; consistently with an annual interest rate of 4 percent. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, is set to 2. The elasticity of substitution between di¤erent product types, , is set to 10 (see, e.g., Galí 2008).
Pricing. Since direct estimates of the parameter of price-adjustment costs, , are not avail- 19 . Based on this report we set the quarterly job-…nding rate, ; at a value of 0:20 and the quarterly …ring rate, ; at a value of 0:02. 
Quantitative Properties of the Competitive Economy
In this section we study the quantitative implications of the model. We assume that monetary policy follows a Taylor rule with a weight 1.5 on in ‡ation. First, we assess the model's ability to replicate the negative relation, outlined in section 2, between turnover costs and output volatility. To make our model results comparable to the empirical ones, we compute the standard deviation of the model's HP-…ltered output for joint productivity and government spending shocks under di¤erent …ring cost levels, leaving all other parameters constant. Figure 2 shows that the model also generates a negative relation between output volatility and …ring costs. Interestingly, this is in contrast with the relation between output volatility and …ring costs found in previous studies using the search and matching model: Silva and Toledo 2009 show that …ring costs in the standard search and matching model amplify, rather than dampen, labor market volatilities.
To complete the assessment of the empirical validity of our model, we compare a series of euro area statistics with the model equivalent. Table 2 reports the standard deviations and the autocorrelations for a number of selected variables for the four largest euro area countries, namely France, Germany, Italy and Spain, and for the EMU period, Q1 1997-Q1 2010. Quarterly data for GDP is taken from Eurostat and data for employment, the job-…nding rate and the separation rate is taken from the OECD dataset. The data are HP-…ltered with a quarterly smoothing parameter of 1600. Table 3 shows equivalent statistics from the model, which have also been computed using Hodrick Prescott …ltered series with the same smoothing parameter as used for the data. Our model is able to produce a sizable standard deviation of the unemployment rate, the job-…nding rate and the separation rate (relative to output). This is again in contrast with the standard search and matching model which, as noticed by Shimer 2005, produces volatilities for unemployment and worker ‡ows that are signi…cantly lower than the ones found in the data. The reason for which our model can generate sizable worker ‡ow volatilities is as follows. Since an aggregate productivity shock increases the expected present value of a worker, …rms are willing to hire workers with larger operating costs, ". The endogenous adjustment of the hiring and …ring thresholds ampli…es the dynamic response to shocks. As a result, the volatility of the job…nding rate and of the separation rate is several times larger than the volatility of the underlying productivity shock (or of output volatility).
In addition, our model always generates a strong negative correlation between the job-…nding and the separation rate (in line with the data), as the hiring and …ring thresholds are tightly connected (see equations 7 and 9). In contrast to that, search and matching models with endogenous separations typically generate a positive correlation between the job-…nding rate and the separation rate (see, e.g., Krause and Lubik 2007).
A comparison between tables 2 and 3 shows that the model also generates high persistence in unemployment and output. Persistent employment and output dynamics are consistent with the empirical evidence and represent an important stylized fact of the business cycle. It has to be noted that employment and output are a lot more persistent than the underlying aggregate shocks. 20 As explained above, employment persistence, namely its dependence on past dynamics, arises due to the time-varying gap between the retention rate and the job …nding rate. When hiring and …ring costs increase, this gap also increases, making employment more persistent. 21 
Social Planner Solution and Competitive Economy
De…nition 1. For a given nominal interest rate fi t g 1 t=0 and for a given set of the exogenous processes fa t ; g t g 1 t=0 a determinate competitive equilibrium for the distorted competitive economy is a sequence of allocations and prices fc t ; t ; mc t ; h;t ; t ; e t ( h;t ); f;t ; t ; i t ( f;t ); w t ; y t ; n t g 1 t=0 which, for given initial B 0 satis…es equations 3, 7, 8, 18, 9, 10, 19, 11, 13, 16, 22 and the production function y t = a t n t .
To highlight the nature of the distortion in the model, we proceed …rst by comparing the solution of the competitive economy with the constrained pareto optimal allocation. 22 Such a comparison allows us to highlight the externality that arises when atomistic agents fail to internalize the aggregate consequences of their decisions. To highlight the role of labor market frictions, we focus on an economy with ‡exible prices and assume that the distortion stemming from monopolistic 2 0 The HP-…ltered productivity (government spending) time series has an autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0.71 (0.69). The autocorrelation coe¢ cients of unemployment and output are 10 to 20 percentage points larger, i.e. the model generates endogenous persistence. 2 1 For a further discussion of the empirical validity of the labor selction model see Lechthaler et al. 2010 . 2 2 In the constrained pareto optimal allocation the planner maximizes agents' utility under technological and resource constraints and by facing the same labor market restrictions, namely hiring and …ring costs, as the competitive agents.
competition is o¤set by an appropriate subsidy such that the steady state marginal costs equal one, mc = 1. Furthermore, for simplicity we assume that government expenditure and unemployment bene…ts are set to zero.
The constrained e¢ cient allocation is obtained by a social planner who maximizes agents' utility under the resource constraint and the evolution of employment. The social planner chooses the set of processes fc t ; n t ; h;t ; f;t g 1 t=0 to maximize:
subject to
(1 n t 1 ) (
and n t = n t 1 (1
where P E denotes the planner economy.
We de…ne
P E t
as the Lagrange multiplier on constraint 24 and P E t as the Lagrange multiplier on constraint 25. After some manipulation of the …rst order conditions, the value of a worker reads as follows:
and the …rst order conditions for the threshold values are
P E f;t
The current (shadow) value of a worker, P E t ; depends positively on aggregate productivity, a t , and on a number of future expected terms. Those future variables a¤ect the current marginal value of a worker as follows. Expected …ring costs, ( P E f;t+1 )f , a¤ect negatively the current value of a worker: for a given …ring rate, ( P E f;t+1 ), an increase in employment increases the number of separated matches. Hence an increase in employment increases expected …ring costs. Expected hiring costs, ( P E h;t+1 )h, a¤ect positively the current value of a worker. For given hiring rate, ( P E h;t+1 ), higher employment reduces the number of future hirings, making the planner save an amount equivalent to ( P E h;t+1 )h. This, in turn, increases the current value of a worker. Furthermore, the current value of a worker is a¤ected negatively by the expected operating costs of incumbent workers, 1
( P E f;t+1 ) i t+1 ( f;t+1 ), and positively by the expected operating costs of new entrants, ( P E h;t+1 ) e t+1 ( h;t+1 ). For given expected operating costs per incumbent worker, i t+1 ( f;t+1 ); an increase in the number of retained incumbent workers increases the overall operating costs. Similarly, for given expected operating costs per entrant, e t+1 ( h;t+1 ), a decrease in the number of hired workers (implied by the lower number of unemployed workers) reduces the overall operating costs.
Finally, the current value also depends on the discounted future value of the worker, P E t+1 ; multiplied by the di¤erence between the retention rate and the hiring rate, 1 P E f;t+1 P E h;t+1 . A worker is more valuable when he is more likely to be retained, as this reduces future hiring and …ring costs.
In the competitive economy, 23 
where w t is the bargained wage (either under collective bargaining or under individualistic bargaining) 24 and s t is the number of applicants at a particular …rm, which is taken as exogenous by atomistic …rms. After taking the …rst order condition with respect to n t and rearranging, we obtain the marginal value of a worker in the competitive economy:
; (31) 2 3 To make analytical results comparable between the social planner solution and the competitive equilibrium we outline the maximization problem of a competitive …rm. 2 4 See the online Appendix for a formal derivation of this case.
while the cuto¤s are given by: 25
The comparison of the equations characterizing the competitive equilibrium and the planner solution highlights similarities and di¤erences. First, the marginal value of a worker in the competitive economy is reduced by the presence of wages which depress …rms'pro…tability and hiring. Second, a …rm in the competitive economy does not take into account the e¤ects of its decisions on the pool of future applicants, s t . In the presence of labor turnover costs hiring decisions lead to long term employment relations. Hence, by hiring a worker today the …rm reduces the potential pool of applicants in the next period. Atomistic …rms do not internalize this type of negative externality, which tends to induce over-hiring in the current period. This generates a composition e¤ect: Compared to the …rst best solution, there are fewer entrants, who have relatively low operating costs (due to the cost of hiring), but more incumbents, who have relatively high operating costs (due to the cost of …ring). Thus, the composition of employment (between incumbents and entrants) is distorted, as atomistic …rms fail to internalize the e¤ects of their hiring behavior on the size of the pool of searching workers.
The two e¤ects just discussed run in opposite directions. Thus, it is possible to imagine a wage rule under which the two e¤ects o¤set each other: 26 this would equalize the solution under the competitive equilibrium and the planner economy. However, in our model such a wage rule cannot be implemented through Nash bargaining processes. This divergence becomes evident by comparing the competitive (Nash bargained) wages and the e¢ cient ones. We derive the e¢ cient wage norm by equating the marginal value of a worker in the competitive and in the planner solution, namely by setting CE f;t = P E f;t . Using equations 26 and 31, we derive the e¢ cient wage as:
The competitive (Nash bargained) wage reads as follows (under the assumptions of mc = 1 and 2 5 This is an alternative formulation of equations 9 and 7. 2 6 Hosios 1990 shows that such a wage rule exists for a search and matching model. b = 0):
The main di¤erence between the two wages lies in the fact that the e¢ cient wage does not depend on any contemporaneous variables, but reacts to future hirings and to the future marginal value of a worker. The opposite is true for the competitive wage, which is insensitive to future variables. The reason for this discrepancy lies in the fact that atomistic …rms do not internalize the e¤ects of their current hiring decisions on the future pool of applicants and on the future hiring prospects, hence the competitive wage remains insensitive to future shocks and ‡uctuations in future variables. The following lemmas formalize this line of arguments.
Lemma 1. The elasticities of the e¢ cient wage with respect to current and future aggregate productivity are governed by the following equations:
Proof. See online Appendix B.
The lemma above makes explicit the fact that e¢ cient wages depend solely on expected future realizations of productivity and of other endogenous variables. The planner, contrary to atomistic …rms, internalizes the fact that current hiring and retentions a¤ect the pool of future applicants.
When choosing the optimal path of employment, he optimally balances current and future hirings and …rings, by taking into account future realizations of productivity. The di¤erence in the dynamic behavior between competitive Nash bargained wages and the e¢ cient ones is therefore a manifestation of the aggregate externality operating in our model. The next lemma follows as a corollary.
Lemma 2. The wage in the competitive economy cannot replicate the e¢ cient wage under standard Nash bargaining. Thus, the competitive economy is not constrained pareto-e¢ cient.
It must be stressed that the above result does not hinge on our assumption that wages are bargained collectively. In online Appendix A we show that also under standard individualistic Nash bargaining wages fail to replicate the e¢ cient one. by turnover costs. We do so in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. The higher …ring costs, the higher is the elasticity of the e¢ cient wage with respect to future productivity shocks (see Figure 3 for an illustration).
Intuitively, turnover costs produce long term contractual relations and their increase makes the expected survival rate of a match longer. The planner responds to this by rendering e¢ cient wages more responsive to future productivity.
Note that since the elasticity of the competitive wage to expected future shocks and to expected future realizations of the endogenous variables is zero, it is by construction insensitive to …ring costs. Hence, when the elasticity of e¢ cient wages to future …ring costs increases, this generates a larger divergence between the dynamic behavior of the competitive and the planner economy:
such a di¤erence in turn measures the extent of the ine¢ ciency. Further below in the numerical results of the Ramsey plan, we show that the optimal volatility of in ‡ation increases when …ring costs increase: this is consistent with the arguments arising from Lemma 3. When the ine¢ ciency increases, the Ramsey planner is more prone to use state contingent movements in in ‡ation to …ght its consequences.
To rejoin the above results to the analysis of the optimal monetary policy design discussed in the next section, it is instructive to discuss how a monetary authority, endowed solely with in ‡ation, can a¤ect the competitive economy so as to get closer to the e¢ cient equilibrium. As discussed above, the e¢ cient wage is more responsive to future shocks: this implies that e¢ cient employment is more stable compared to the competitive one. The Ramsey monetary authority should therefore aim at stabilizing the employment ‡uctuations in the competitive economy. Consider the equation characterizing …rms'hiring decision:
The monetary authority can use state contingent movements in in ‡ation, by increasing its volatility. This stabilizes ‡uctuations of current and future pro…ts (the right hand side of the above equation), ‡uctuations of hiring and …ring thresholds and therefore of employment.
6 Optimal Ramsey Policy
Ramsey Setup
The optimal monetary policy plan is determined by a monetary authority that maximizes the discounted sum of agents' utilities given the constraints of the competitive economy. The next task is to select the relations that represent the relevant constraints in the planner's optimal policy problem. This amounts to describing the competitive equilibrium in terms of a minimal set of relations involving only real allocations, in the spirit of the primal approach described in Lucas and Stokey 1983. 27 a t mc t w t h;t + E t ( t;t+1 t+1 ) = h (39) a t mc t w t f;t + E t ( t;t+1 t+1 ) = f (40)
(1 n t 1 ) t e t 2 ( t 1) 2 y t
The government resource constraint does not need to be included among the equilibrium conditions as …scal policy is passive (lump sum taxation).
De…nition 2. Let n t = f 1;t ; 2;t ; 3;t ; 4;t ; 5;t ; 6;t g 1 t=0 represent the sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (39), (40), (41), (42), (43), (44) . Then for a given stochastic process fa t ; g t g 1 t=0 , plans for the control variables n t fc t ; n t ; w t ; mc t; t ; v h;t ; v f;t g 1 t=0 and for the co-state variables n t = f 1;t ; 2;t ; 3;t ; 4;t ; 5;t ; 6;t g 1 t=0 represent a …rst best constrained allocation if they solve the following maximization problem:
subject to (39) , (40), (41), (42), (43), (44) .
As a result of constraints (39), (40) and (43) (39), (40) and (43) respectively, bear the crucial meaning of tracking, along the dynamics, the value to the planner of committing to the pre-announced policy plan. Another aspect concerns the speci…cation of the law of motion of these Lagrange multipliers.
For this case, both constraints feature a simple one period expectation, the same co-state variables have to obey the laws of motion:
Using the new co-state variables so far described, we amplify the state space of the Ramsey allocation to be fa t ; g t ; 1;t ; 2;t ; 5;t g 1 t=0 and we de…ne a new saddle point problem which is recursive in the new state space. Consistently with a timeless perspective, we set the values of the three costate variables at time zero equal to their solution in the steady state. 
Response to Shocks and Optimal Volatility of In ‡ation
To compute responses of the optimal plan to shocks we resort on …rst order approximations of the …rst order conditions of the Lagrangian problem described in de…nition 2. Technically, we compute the stationary allocation that characterizes the deterministic steady state of the …rst order conditions to the Ramsey plan. We then compute a second order approximation 28 of the respective policy functions in the neighborhood of the same steady state. This amounts to implicitly assuming that the economy has been evolving and policy has been conducted around such a steady state already for a long period of time (under timeless perspective). An interesting question is whether the policy maker favors larger movements in in ‡ation when the extent of the distortion becomes larger. As discussed in Lemma 3 and demonstrated in …gure 3, larger labor turnover costs lead to larger ine¢ ciencies, hence they increase the incentives of the policy maker to deviate from the zero in ‡ation policy. This is con…rmed by …gure 6 which shows that the optimal volatility of in ‡ation, in response to both productivity and government expenditure shocks, increases when …ring costs increase.
Comparison with a Model of Wage Rigidity
Monetary trade-o¤s also emerge in a model with wage rigidities along the lines of Erceg et al. 2000 (EHL hereafter). It is therefore instructive to compare the two models in terms of implications for business cycle dynamics and the design of optimal monetary policy. To do so, we construct and simulate a model with Rotemberg adjustment costs in both prices and wages and an endogenous labor supply (i.e. with disutility of labor), which we label the wage rigidity (WR) model, 29 but 2 9 Note that EHL use Calvo staggering instead of Rotemberg adjustment costs. We use Rotemberg adjustment costs to get a closer comparison between the two models. In contrast to EHL, we do not use subsidies to remove the monopolistic distortions. However, the introduction of subsidies would only lead to some quantitative changes (i.e., leave our main conclusions una¤ected).
without labor selection and labor turnover costs. The parameters common across the two models are set as before. For the WR model, we set the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ', to 1 and the wage rigidity parameter to four quarters. In the optimal monetary policy analysis, we consider average contracts in the range from two to six quarters. 30 We start by comparing the business cycle properties of the two models and their relation to the data. line with the data (EHL is silent about this). The volatilities of those variables in our model are quite high, as in the data. Second, the wage volatility in our model is also close to the one in the data. On the contrary, the wage volatility in EHL is excessively smooth. In our model wages are compressed in the cross-section, but they do not feature any rigidity over time. Interestingly in our model wages are even more volatile than the underlying productivity shocks, which is due to the ‡uctuations in marginal costs. Third, in contrast to EHL, in our model macro and labor market 3 0 To calibrate the parameter for the cost of wage adjustment, we equate the log-linear version of the Phillips curve for wages under the Rotemberg and Calvo set-ups. This leads to the following expression for the parameter on the cost of wage adjustment:
, where is the elasticity across di¤erent varieties of labor services and w represents the probability of adjusting wages.
variables are highly persistent: autocorrelations are indeed high, particularly those of output and unemployment. Traditional medium-scale DSGE models resort to a number of additional model devices (habit persistence, variable capital utilization, etc.) to re-produce the empirically relevant macro persistence. In our model this persistence comes genuinely from the mechanisms at work in the labor market. The two models can be compared also in terms of their implications for optimal monetary policy. We calculate the optimal volatility of in ‡ation using the Ramsey approach also for the WR model and compare it with our model. Table 5 illustrates the results. Under an elasticity of substitution of = 10, the two models yield fairly similar results. Notice that for the WR model the parameter represents both, the elasticity across di¤erent product varieties and across di¤erent labor services. Under our benchmark calibration for the …ring costs, namely 60% of output, the optimal in ‡ation volatility for our model is 1.6%. For the WR model, the optimal volatility of in ‡ation is 2% when the average contract duration is four quarters. For the WR model, the optimal in ‡ation volatility increases with the degree of wage rigidity, while in our model it increases with the level of …ring costs. Interestingly the results are also a¤ected by the degree of varieties substitution (and labor services for the WR model). With a value of = 4 (as in EHL 2000), the optimal volatility of in ‡ation falls in the WR model, while it increases in our model.
For this parameter speci…cation, the policy trade o¤s are ampli…ed in our model and dampened in the EHL. This di¤erence also highlights important di¤erences in the shock transmission between the two models. In our model the elasticity of substitution a¤ects nominal rigidities: when it falls, market competition falls and so do the sensitivity of prices to shocks and the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Since in ‡ation is less costly, the policy maker trades o¤ in ‡ation with output volatility.
In the WR model a fall in dampens ‡uctuations in the wage mark-up, hence the welfare costs of real wage rigidities. The incentives of the policy maker to correct labor market distortions are lower and the optimal volatility of in ‡ation falls.
In closing, some observations are worth on the micro-foundations related to each of the two models. In our model, it is possible to connect labor turnover costs to institutional parameters (e.g. employment protection legislation) or primitive parameters (e.g. training costs). By contrast, the sources of wage rigidities are not fully understood yet and cannot easily be connected to one speci…c institution.
Conclusions
The design of optimal monetary policy is derived in a DSGE model with sticky prices, labor selection, labor turnover costs and Nash bargained wages. The type of labor market frictions 
